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1. Introduction
It is a consensus that the main source of high living quality today comparing to another
centuries comes from the non-stop of world economic growth beginning three hundred of
years ago. Recently, it is one of the most important reason for the improvement of level of
life in new developing countries as Vietnam or Chine. Countries, for example Singapore,
go even very far in the goal of economic growth in putting real GDP growth rate as an
important indicator in calculations of the bonus for Prime Minister and the ministers.
In spite of this consensus, the trade-off between efficiency and equality always causes big
debates not among only economists but also politicians or even historians. An extremist
privilege could cause massive complication for human welfare. Taking for example the
Soviet Union under Stalinist era. The huge bureaucratic efforts in concentrating almost
saving for the industrial sector allowed the Russia, from a backward lagging behind be-
comes an industrialised country and catch up the occidental countries in many important
technological domains, which resulted in the victory in the second world war. But the
cost for this brutal industrialisation process is immeasurable suffer of millions of souls.
In the classical work ”Theory of justice”, Rawls [25] poses the following question: what
would be the choice for the outcome of the society if one is cached behind a veil of
ignorance? In the total lack of information about the condition under which he1 will be
born, the economic agent should choose the maximization of the least favoured person
(or generation). For example, given a inter-temporal consumption streams, his evaluation
criterion of inter-temporal utilities streams should be
U(c0, c1, c2, . . . ) = inf
t≥0
u(ct),
where u(ct) is the utility of the t
th generation.
Naturally, numerous attempts, for example the seminar contributions of Arrow [3], Calvo
[7] or Phelps & Riley [24], have been done to study the evolution of the economy if this
criterion is used to evaluate inter-temporal welfare. Arrow [3] assumes constant produc-
tivity. Calvo [7] studies the maximin problem with uncertain technology. Phelps & Riley
studies a dynamic programming structure which lies with the maximin criterion. The
result is pessimistic: if the initial accumulation of capital is low, the economy remains in
this low capital accumulation situation forever.
The strong dependency of the economy in initial state is beautifully articulated in the
words of Solow [22] ”My impression is that, in the situations considered so far, the max-min
criterion function does not function very well as a principle of intergenerational equity...
It calls, as I have mentioned, for zero net saving with stationary technology, and for
negative net saving with advancing technology. That is by itself not off-putting. What
is less satisfactory is the fact that the max-min criterion is so much at the mercy of the
initial conditions. If the initial capital stock is very small, no more will be accumulated
and the standard of living will be low forever.”
It is clear about the need of a consideration about trade-off efficiency - equality.
What happens then if we combine the famous Ramsey criterion, which evaluates the
inter-temporal utilities streams using a constant discount rate β ∈ (0, 1), and the Rawls
1We use male pronouns as a convenient default.
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criterion? Precisely, we can consider the evaluation criterion as follows:
U(c0, c1, c2, . . . ) =
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct) + a inf
t≥0
u(ct),
with some positive parameter a, representing the importance of equality in the choice of
the economic agent2.
There are always sacrificed generations with the Ramsey criterion. If the level of produc-
tivity is high, the utility of the present generations will be lowered for a rapid accumulation
of capital, and on the contrary, the generations in the distant future will be subject to
the same decision. And what would happen if we combine Ramsey and Rawls criteria, by
considering in one criterion not only efficiency but also equality?
This is not the only motivation which urges us to study the Ramsey-Rawls combination
problem.
The link between the results in decision theory and the time discounting literature is
strong. The reason for this tight link is clear: by normalizing the time discounting system
in order to obtain a probability and consider the set of time as the set of states, the inter-
temporal choice is equivalent to an act in the world of Savage [26]. For example while
the theorem of Savage [26] poses an axiomatic base for mean expected utility, the works of
Koopmans in [17] and [18] provide the conditions for the inter-temporal representation in
the later.
In recent decades, there is a vast literature which expands the world of Savage, by extending
the theory in order to encompass the behaviours which do not satisfy Savage’s famous sure-
thing principle. The classical work of Gilboa & Schmeidler [15] formulates the notion of
ambiguity aversion, representing the behaviour of an economic agent as always maximizing
the worst scenario among the set of different possible probabilities.
In a parallel line of thinking, the same consideration can also be made in the time dis-
counting domain. Let ∆ be the set of time discounting systems possibles:
∆ =
{
π = (π0, π1, . . . ) such that πs > 0, ∀s and
∞∑
s=0
πs = 1
}
.
The inter-temporal evaluation of the economic agent, while having only a vague idea about
the appropriate time discounting system to choose, but knowing that the appropriate time
discount system must belong to D, a subset of ∆, can be represented as follows, in the
same spirit of Gilboa & Schmeidler [15]:
U(c0, c1, c2, . . . ) = inf
π∈D
[
∞∑
t=0
πtu(ct)
]
.
Recently, Chambers & Echenique [9] established the axiomatic bases for the maximin
criterion inter-temporal evaluation, with different discount rates. The corresponding set
∆ in the set up of Chamber & Echenique [9] is a convex hull of a set of time discounting
systems which are geometrical sequences3.
2A similar combination (between a Ramsey part and an infinite part following the non-dictatorial
criterion) is studied by Alvarez-Cuadrado & Long [2], and Asheim & Ekeland [5].
3Drugeon & al [11] prove that the solution of optimization problem under this criterion is monotonic
and time consistent.
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Imagine a situation where the ambiguity is total, for example our agent is cached behind
a veil of ignorance. Without any possible information to predict the future, the set of all
possible time discounting systems should be ∆ and the inter-temporal evaluation becomes
U(c0, c1, c2, . . . ) = inf
π∈∆
[
∞∑
t=0
πtu(ct)
]
= inf
t≥0
u(ct).
We can push further the question about the criterion with multiple possible time dis-
counting systems. Suppose the agent is not completely ignorant but always has doubts
about his choice of a time discounting system. Our agent has ”opinion” that the good
constant discount rate to choose is β ∈ (0, 1) and the corresponding discount rates system
is π∗t = (1− β)β
t, for all t ≥ 04.
The word ”opinion” is used in the same spirit as Kopylov [19], to define a state of mind
that is less rigid than ”belief”. The economic agent thinks that π∗ is a good choice, but
there are reasons suggesting him that this conclusion could be hasty. He should also take
into account all other time discounting systems. Precisely, he should consider the set
D = (1− λ)π∗ + λ∆, with some 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
This formulation is very similar to the λ−contamination literature, with the axiomatic
foundation established in Alon [1], and Kopylov [19]. The parameter λ represents the lack
of confidence in the choice π∗ of the agent. If λ = 1, the ambiguity is total. In contrast to
this, if λ = 0, he believes without doubt that π∗ is the good one.
Under the λ−contamination criterion, the inter-temporal evaluation becomes
U(c0, c1, c2, . . . ) = inf
π∈D
[
∞∑
t=0
πtu(ct)
]
= (1− λ)
∞∑
t=0
(1− β)βtu(ct) + λ inf
π∈∆
[
∞∑
t=0
πtu(ct)
]
= (1− λ)
∞∑
t=0
(1− β)βtu(ct) + λ inf
t≥0
u(ct).
Taking a = λ(1−λ)(1−β) , this is equivalent to the criterion being represented as
U(c0, c1, c2, . . . ) =
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct) + a inf
t≥0
u(ct).
One more time, we find the Ramsey-Rawls combination. The main of this work is devoted
to the study of this problem.
In our knowledge, the most close work to our article is the one of Alvarez-Cuadrado &
Van Long [2]. In this important article, Alvarez-Cuadrado & Van Long consider the same
criterion (called mixed Bentham - Rawls criterion) under the continuous time configura-
tion. They analysis are based on a maximization problem where the infimum of utility
stream are supposed to be greater than a certain value u, which is considered as a control
parameter. The observation of the solution and the choice of the optimal parameter u
4The term 1− β is just a normalizing term, to ensures that
∑∞
t=0 pi
∗
t = 1.
5
give us the properties of optimal path.
Similarly to the approach of Alvarez-Cuadrado & Van Long [2], in the discrete time con-
figuration, we consider the following modified optimization problem: if we accept to lower
the value of the Rawls part to ǫ, what is the best we can make for the Ramsey part? By
lowering the former, we have more room to improve the later. And what is the optimal
acceptable level ǫ? The optimal ǫ can be considered as the efficiency-equality trade-off
cost. Our results echo the ones in Alvarez-Cuadrado & Van Long [2], exceptionally their
Proposition 3. Moreover, in this article, we give a detailed analysis of the trade-off func-
tion, and basing on the description of this function, we can characterize the critical level
for the equality parameter a.
This modification allows us to study the classical optimization problems with an additional
constraint. We can hence apply the usual techniques well-known in dynamic programming
literature to circumvent the difficulties being posed by the time-inconsistency of the cri-
terion.
If the level of productivity is high, the utility of the early dates (or generations) are reduced
as much as possible, for the sake of a rapid accumulation of capital. It is worth to sacrifice
even a litter bit the value of the equality criterion, in order to have a better accumulation
level of capital.
Once the capital accumulation level is sufficiently high, the economy following a Ramsey
path does not violate the equality constraints, and converges to a steady state, or infinity,
if such steady state does not exist. Thanks to the constraints imposed by the equality
criteria of Rawls, the difference of utility between early and later dates is not too high.
In the case of low productivity, the economy converges to a higher steady state than the
one of the Ramsey problem. The difference between the lowest weighted dates (in distant
future) and the highest weighted dates (in present) is diminished. The optimal choice in
the long term behaves as that at a steady state of some Ramsey problem with a higher
discount rate.
Moreover, if the pondering weight of the equality part is high, the optimal sequence coin-
cides with the solution of Rawls problem. For a high importance of the equality part, the
Ramsey part has no effect.
The techniques used in our article also allow us to consider a configuration α−maximin,
which is difficult to analyse in the continous time configuration of Alvarez-Cuadrado &
Van Long [2]. The Rawls criterion may be considered too severe, since it cares only
about the worst generation. This can be considered as a special case of the α−maximin
formulation in Arrow & Hurwicz [4], Ghirardato & al [14], or Chateauneuf & al [10],
balancing pessimism and optimism, which considers not only the worst case but also the
best case5. Their generalization consists the criterion which is a convex combination of
the worst and the best scenarios. Applying to the context of this article, the criterion
becomes as follows
U(c0, c1, . . . ) = α sup
t≥0
u(ct) + (1− α) inf
t≥0
u(ct),
for some 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. The Rawls criterion is equivalent to the case α = 0. The parameter
5Bossert & al [6] also take into account the worst and the best cases, but their formulation is much
more different with the ones treated in our article. In this article we do not have ambition to make an
exhaustive review of the ambiguity literature, which is very large. For a general review about formulation
under uncertainty, see Etner, Jeleva and Tallon [12].
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α can be considered as the optimism degree of the economic agent.
For small initial value, the economy has an infinite number of solutions. Every optimal
path fluctuates between two different values determined by the fundamental parameters
of the problem. For initial value high enough, there exists unique solution and this path
takes constant value from the date t = 1.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 considers the optimization under Rawls
criterion, with a general production function and utility function. Section 3 analyses
the Ramsey-Rawls problem. Using results of Section 3, Section 5 studies the problem
with linear production function and logarithmic utility function. The proofs are given in
Appendix.
2. Optimal solution under Rawlsian criterion
We consider the following optimization problem under the Rawls criterion:
max
[
inf
t≥0
u(ct)
]
,
under the constraint ct + kt+1 ≤ f(kt) for all t, with k0 > 0 given.
Let Π(k0) be the set of feasible paths {kt}
∞
t=0: 0 ≤ kt+1 ≤ f(kt) for any t. This set is
compact in the product topology. For each feasible sequence k = (k0, k1, k2, . . . ) in Π(k0),
define
ν(k) = inf
t≥0
u
(
f(kt)− kt+1
)
.
The upper semi-continuity of the Rawls criterion with respect to this topology requires
only the continuity of the utility function and the production function.
Lemma 2.1. Assume that the utlity function u and the production function f are contin-
uous:
i) The function ν is upper semi-continuous for the product topology.
ii) There exists k∗ ∈ Π(k0) such that
ν
(
k
∗
)
= max
k∈Π(k0)
ν
(
k
)
.
For the description of the solution of Rawls problem, we add the concavity of production
function f , and the existence of a non-trivial feasible sequence.
Assumption A1. The utility function u is strictly concave, increasing and satisfies Inada
condition. The production function f is concave, strictly increasing and satisfies f ′(0) >
16.
Denote by k the solution to f ′(k) = 1, which maximizes f(k) − k. In the case f ′(k) > 1
for any k ≥ 0, let k = +∞.
6Otherwise every feasible sequence converges to zero, and the problem becomes trivial.
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Under the continuity of utility function and the concavity of production function, we can
prove that for k0 smaller than k, the optimal choice for is to remain in the status quo. For
k0 bigger than k, there exists an infinite number of optimal paths, and the optimal value
is u
(
f(k)− k
)
.
Proposition 2.1. i) Consider the case 0 ≤ k0 ≤ k. The problem has a unique solution
k
∗ = (k0, k0, . . .) and
max
k∈Π(k0)
ν(k) = u (f(k0)− k0) .
ii) Consider the case k is finite and k0 ≥ k. The problem has an infinite number of
solutions and
max
k∈Π(k0)
ν(k) = u
(
f(k)− k
)
.
From now on, for the sake of simplicity, let νˆ(k0) be the best value possible for the Rawls
criteria with initial state k0:
νˆ(k0) = max
k∈Π(k0)
ν
(
k
)
.
3. The dynamics under Ramsey-Rawls criterion
3.1 Ramsey-Rawls problem
We consider in this section the criterion which a a convex combination of the well-known
criteria Ramsey and Rawls:
U(c0, c1, . . . ) =
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct) + a inf
t≥0
u(ct),
where a is a positive constant. We will use the term ”Ramsey part” to denote the sum∑∞
t=0 β
tu(ct) and ”Rawls part” to denote inft≥0 u(ct).
Consider the following optimization problem (P ):
V (k0) = sup
[
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct) + a inf
t≥0
u(ct)
]
s.c ct + kt+1 ≤ f(kt) for any t ≥ 0,
k0 ≥ 0 is given.
From now on, for the sake of simplicity, we let ct = f(kt)− kt+1, for any t and feasible set
{kt}
∞
t=0.
In Section 2, we know that the Rawls part, ν(k) = inft≥0 u (f(kt)− kt+1) is upper semi-
continuous in respect to the product topology. It is well-known in the literature that under
suitable conditions, the Ramsey part
∑∞
t=0 β
tu(ct) is also upper semi-continuous. In order
to simplify the exposition, we assume this upper semi-continuity property. Curious readers
can refer to the work of Le Van & Morhaim [16] for the details of the conditions ensuring
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this property, with the most important one being the tail-insensitivity condition.
Assumption A2. Assume that for any feasible sequence {kt}
∞
t=0, the function∑∞
t=0 β
tu(ct) is determined and satisfies upper semi-continuity with respect to the product
topology.
Under this assumption, the Ramsey part is also upper semi-continuous, and hence the
same property is satisfied for the function U . Furthermore the problem (P ) always has
optimal solution and we can write:
V (k0) = max
k∈Π(k0)
[
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct) + a inf
t≥0
u(ct)
]
.
The strictly concavity of utility function u ensures the uniqueness of the optimal solution.
3.2 Ramsey problem
In this subsection, we evoke some well-known results in the literature of the Ramsey model.
Under Assumption A2, the Ramsey problem always has a solution. The strict concavity of
the utility function u implies the uniqueness. Denote by v the value function and {kˆt}
∞
t=0
the optimal solution of the Ramsey problem:
v(k0) = max
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct)
s.c ct + kt+1 ≤ f(kt) for any t ≥ 0,
k0 is given.
By the uniqueness of optimal solution, and the well-known result that v is solution to an
functional Bellman equation, there exists an optimal policy function σ which is strictly
increasing such that kˆt+1 = σ(kˆt), for any t.
We recall here an important feature of the Ramsey problem. When the productivity is high
(f ′(k0) >
1
β
), the economic agent prefers to sacrifice the welfare of the early dates (or early
generations) for a rapid accumulation of capital. The economy saves. The consumption
sequence is increasing in this case.
In contrast to this, when the productivity is low (f ′(k0) <
1
β
), the economy chooses to
dissaving. The impatience imposed by the discount rate implies the welfare sacrifices of
dates (ou generations) in a distant future. In this set up, the consumption sequence is
decreasing.
Let ks be a solution to
f ′(k) =
1
β
.
If the solution is not unique, we can take any one in the set of solutions. If f ′(x) > 1
β
for
all x ≥ 0, let ks =∞, and if f ′(x) ≤ 1
β
for all x ≥ 0, let ks = 0.
Lemma 3.1. i) If k0 ≤ k
s, then the consumption sequence {cˆt}
∞
t=0 and capital accumu-
lation {kˆt}
∞
t=0 sequence are increasing, and converge respectively to c
s = f(ks) − ks
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and ks. As a consequence of this,
ν
(
kˆ
)
= u(cˆ0).
ii) If k0 ≥ k
s, the consumption sequence {cˆt}
∞
t=0 and capital accumulation {kˆt}
∞
t=0 se-
quence are decreasing, and converge respectively to cs = f(ks) − ks and ks. As a
consequence of this,
ν
(
kˆ
)
= u (f(ks)− ks) .
3.3 Ramsey-modified problem
For ǫ ≥ 0, we first consider the following intermediary problem (P ǫ):
max
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct)
s.c ct + kt+1 ≤ f(kt), ∀ t ≥ 0,
u(ct) ≥ νˆ(k0)− ǫ, ∀ t ≥ 0,
k0 is given.
The intuition for studying this problem runs as follows. We already know that the maxi-
mum value possible for the Rawls part is νˆ(k0). Naturally, the following question rises: if
we accept a lower value of the Rawls part up to ǫ, what is the best improvement we can
obtain for the Ramsey part? And which is the optimal acceptable sacrifice level ǫ? This
optimal value represents the cost of the trade-off between efficiency and equality.
In order to respond to these questions, we study the problem (P ǫ) for some ǫ > 0. The
Proposition 3.1 states that the optimal solution of (P ) is also the optimal solution of (P ǫ),
for some optimal value ǫ.
Proposition 3.1. For any k0 ≥ 0,
V (k0) = max
ǫ≥0
[
W (ǫ) + a (νˆ(k0)− ǫ)
]
.
By the Proposition 3.1, in order to understand the behavior of the optimal solution of
initial problem (P ), we study the behavior of the optimal solution of problems (P ǫ), with
ǫ ≥ 0.
For the sake of simplicity, from now on, we will use the term ”equality constraint” to
denote the constraint u(ct) ≥ νˆ(k0) − ǫ. Let W (ǫ) be the value of the problem (P
ǫ) and
{cǫt, k
ǫ
t+1}
∞
t=0 be its optimal solution. By the strict concavity of u, this sequence is unique.
It is obvious that, if ǫ is sufficiently big, the solution of Ramsey problem satisfied also
the equality constraints, and solving problem (P ǫ) becomes trivial task. Let ǫ˜ be the
critical value for this property: if we accept to lower the Rawls part to ǫ˜, the solution
of Ramsey problem satisfies also the constraint of the Ramsey-modified problem, and
becomes solution of the later one.
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Define
ǫ˜ =

u
(
f(k0)− k0
)
− u
(
f(k0)− σ(k0)
)
if 0 ≤ k0 ≤ k
s,
u
(
f(k0)− k0
)
− u
(
f(ks)− ks
)
if ks ≤ k0 ≤ k
u
(
f(k)− k
)
− u
(
f(ks)− ks
)
if k0 ≥ k.
The proof of Lemma 3.2 is easy, based on the fact that the solution of Ramsey problem
satisfies the constraints of Ramsey-modified one for sufficiently high ǫ.
Lemma 3.2. Assume that ǫ ≥ ǫ˜.
i) The optimal solution of problem (P ǫ) coincides with the solution of Ramsey problem.
ii) W (ǫ) =W (ǫ˜) = v(k0).
If ǫ = 0, by Proposition 2.1, the optimal solution is (k0, k0, . . . ). We consider now the
interesting case, where 0 < ǫ ≤ ǫ˜.
If 0 ≤ k0 ≤ k
s, the equality constraints are binding in the early dates and the optimal
solution behaves as a solution of Ramsey problem when the accumulation of capital reaches
a sufficiently high level.
If k0 ≥ k
s, the equality constraints are binding from some date T sufficiently big and in
the long term, every date (or generation) has the same utility level, which is equal exactly
the lowest level acceptable.
Proposition 3.2. i) Consider the case 0 < k0 < k
s. If 0 < ǫ ≤ ǫ˜, there exists T such
that:
a) For 0 ≤ t ≤ T , u(cǫt) = νˆ(k0)− ǫ.
b) For t ≥ T + 1, u(cǫt) > νˆ(k0)− ǫ.
c) The sequence {kǫt}
∞
t=T+1 is the solution of Ramsey problem with initial state k
ǫ
T+1.
ii) Consider the case k0 > k
s. If 0 < ǫ ≤ ǫ˜, there exists T such that
a) For 0 ≤ t ≤ T , u(cǫt) > νˆ(k0)− ǫ.
b) For t ≥ T + 1, u(cǫt) = νˆ(k0)− ǫ.
For the case k0 ≥ k
s, define k˜ as the solution to
u
(
f(k˜)− k˜
)
= νˆ(k0)− ǫ.
It is easy to verify that the kǫt = k˜ for T sufficiently high. Let β˜ be the discount rate
satisfying
f ′(k˜) =
1
β˜
.
By Proposition 2.1 and the choice of ǫ˜, we have ks < k˜ < k. Hence β˜ > β. In the long
term, the optimal solution for the case k0 ≥ k
s behaves as a solution of a Ramsey problem
with discount rate β˜, greater than β.
Lemma 3.3 is direct consequence of Proposition 3.2. The function W is strictly concave in
respect to ǫ belonging to [0, ǫ˜]. This concavity implies the existence of the right derivative
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of W at 0 and the left derivative of W at ǫ˜. In Section 3.4, these two values will play
the role of critical thresholds for the equality parameter a. The behavior of the optimal
solution depends strongly in the relative position of a and W ′(0), W ′−(ǫ˜). The details will
be presented in subsection 3.4.
For instance, we give some results about W ′(0) and W ′−(ǫ˜).
Lemma 3.3. i) For any k0, the function W is strictly concave on [0, ǫ˜].
ii) If 0 ≤ k0 < k
s, then W ′(0) = +∞ and W ′(ǫ˜) = 0.
iii) If k0 > k
s, then W ′(0) < +∞.
3.4 Optimal solution of Ramsey-Rawls problem
Denote by ǫ∗ the optimal level in Proposition 3.1:
ǫ∗ = argmax
ǫ≥0
[W (ǫ) + a (νˆ(k0)− ǫ)] .
Let {k∗t }
∞
t=0 be the corresponding optimal solution of the Ramsey-modified problem. By
Proposition 3.1, the sequence {k∗t }
∞
t=0 is also the solution of Ramsey-Rawls problem.
In the case the productivity is high (f ′(k0) >
1
β
), the utility of the early dates (or gener-
ations) are lowered as much as possible, for the sake of a rapid accumulation of capital.
It is worth to sacrifice even a litter bit the value of the equality part, in order to have a
better accumulation level of capital.
Once the capital accumulation level is sufficiently high, the economy follows a Ramsey
path which does not violate the equality constraints, and converges to the steady state
ks. Thanks to the constraints imposed by the equality criterion of Rawls, the difference in
utility between early dates and the later dates in distant future is not too high. This dif-
ference depends negatively on the equality parameter a, which imposes a trade-off between
equality and the speed of convergence to the steady state.
Proposition 3.3. Consider the case 0 < k0 ≤ k
s. For any a > 0, we have 0 < ǫ∗ < ǫ˜ and
there exists T such that
i) For 0 ≤ t ≤ T , u(c∗t ) = u
(
f(k0)− k0
)
− ǫ∗.
ii) For t ≥ T + 1, u(c∗t ) > u
(
f(k0)− k0
)
− ǫ∗.
iii) The sequence {k∗t }
∞
t=T+1 is the solution of Ramsey problem with initial state k
∗
T+1.
In the case of low productivity (f ′(k0) <
1
β
), the equality part (if sufficiently high) causes
the economy to converge to a higher steady state than the one of Ramsey problem. The
difference between the lowest dates (in distant future) and the highest dates (in present) is
diminished. The optimal choice in long term behaves as at a steady state of some Ramsey
problem with a value of discount rate β˜ higher than β.
This value is defined as follows. From a certain date T , we have u(c∗t ) = νˆ(k0) − ǫ
∗ for
t ≥ T+1. Let k˜0 be the capital accumulation which is solution to u
(
f(k)−k
)
= νˆ(k0)−ǫ
∗.
The economy then behaves as in the steady state corresponding to the discount factor β˜
which satisfies
f ′(k˜0) =
1
β
.
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Since k˜0 ≥ k
s, we have β˜ ≥ β.
Moreover, there exists a threshold for equality parameter a. Beyond this threshold, the
optimal sequence remains the same and every date (or generations) enjoys the same utility
level.
If the equality parameter a is too low, there is no change in the behavior of the economy,
comparing with the Ramsey problem.
Proposition 3.4. Consider the case k0 ≥ k
s.
i) For W ′(ǫ˜) < a < W ′(0), we have 0 < ǫ∗ < ǫ˜ and there exists T such that:
a) For 0 ≤ t ≤ T , u(c∗t ) > νˆ(k0)− ǫ
∗.
b) For t ≥ T + 1, u(c∗t ) = νˆ(k0)− ǫ
∗.
ii) For a ≥W ′(0), ǫ∗ = 0 and for any t, k∗t = k0.
iii) For 0 ≤ a ≤W ′(ǫ˜), we have ǫ∗ = ǫ˜ and the optimal solution of problem (P ) coincides
with the solution of the Ramsey problem with initial state k0.
4. Optimisation under α−maximin criterion
4.1 The α−maximin problem and the sup-modified problem
Consider the following problem,
V(k0) = sup
[
α sup
t≥0
u(ct) + (1− α) inf
t≥0
u(ct)
]
,
s.c. ct + kt+1 ≤ f(kt) for all t ≥ 0,
k0 is given.
Observe that the supremum part is not upper semi-continuous with respect to the pro-
duction topology 7.
The idea is similar to the one the previous section. In order to determine the supremum
value of the optimisation problem, consider the following sup-modified problem: For ǫ > 0,
define
W(ǫ) = max
[
sup
t≥0
u(ct)
]
,
s.c ct + kt+1 ≤ f(kt), for all t ≥ 0,
ct ≥ νˆ(k0)− ǫ, for all t ≥ 0.
Let Πǫ(k0) be the set of feasible paths of this problem.
7For example, consider a set of feasible sequence {knt }
∞
t=0 such that for any 0 ≤ t ≤ n, c
n
t = f(k
n
t ) −
knt+1 = 0, and for t ≥ n+ 1, c
n
t = f(k
n
t )− k
n
t+1 = c
∗ > 0. While in the product topology, the sequence cn
= {cnt }
∞
t=0 converges to (0, 0, . . . ), the limit of u(c
n
t ) is
lim
n→∞
sup
t≥0
u(cnt ) = u(c
∗) > u(0).
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If we accept to reduce the value of the infimum part to ǫ, we have more room to optimize
the other part, and what is the best we can do? The resolution of the Denote by Πǫ(k0)
be the set of feasible paths of the sup-modified problem. problem will help us the response
for the initial one, as stated in the Lemma 4.1.
Lemma 4.1. We have
V(k0) = max
ǫ≥0
[αW(ǫ) + (1− α) (νˆ(k0)− ǫ)] .
4.2 Solution of the sup-modified problem
With Lemma 4.1, we solve the modified problem, with some ǫ > 0. Let xǫ be the solution
in [0, k0] to the equation
u (f(x)− x) = u (f(k0)− k0)− ǫ.
If ǫ is big such that u (f(x)− x) ≥ u (f(k0)− k0)− ǫ for any 0 ≤ x ≤ k0, let x
ǫ = 0.
Similarly, let xǫ be the solution in [k0,+∞) solution to the same equation. If u (f(x)− x) ≥
u (f(k0)− k0)− ǫ for any x ≥ k0, let x
ǫ = +∞.
For the case 0 ≤ k0 ≤ k, there exist an infinite number of optimal paths, and every optimal
path fluctuates between xǫ and xǫ.
Proposition 4.1. Consider the case 0 ≤ k0 ≤ k.
i) For any ǫ ≥ 0,
W(ǫ) = u (f(xǫ)− xǫ) .
ii) For any optimal path {kt}
∞
t=0, we have
xǫ < kt < x
ǫ.
Moreover,
lim inf
t→∞
kt = x
ǫ,
lim sup
t→∞
kt = x
ǫ.
The case k is finite and k0 ≥ k deserves a slightly change in the treatment. The optimal
value does not depend on k0 and we have νˆ(k0) = u
(
f(k)− k
)
for any k0 ≥ k.
If for any 0 ≤ x ≤ k, u (f(x)− x) ≥ u
(
f(k)− k
)
− ǫ, let x˜ǫ = 0. Otherwise, let x˜ǫ be theunique solution in [0, k] to
u (f(x)− x) = u
(
f(k)− k
)
− ǫ.
Since k is finite, we have f ′(∞) < 1, and there is unique x˜ǫ in [k,+∞) solution to
u (f(x)− x) = u
(
f(k)− k
)
− ǫ.
Note that contrary to the case k0 ≤ k, in this case the values x˜ǫ and x˜ǫ are independent
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with k0. If k0 ≤ x˜
ǫ, then there exists an infinite number of solutions, and every optimal
path fluctuates between x˜ǫ and x˜ǫ.
Only for the case k0 is sufficiently big, there exists unique solution and this solution is
constant from the date t = 1.
Proposition 4.2. Consier the case k0 ≥ k.
i) If k ≤ k0 ≤ x˜
ǫ, then
W(ǫ) = u
(
f(x˜ǫ)− x˜ǫ
)
.
Moreover, there is an infinite number of solutions. Every optimal paths {kt}
∞
t=0 sat-
isfies
x˜ǫ < kt < x˜ǫ,
and
lim inf
t→∞
kt = x˜ǫ,
lim sup
t→∞
kt = x˜
ǫ.
ii) If k0 ≥ x˜
ǫ, then
W(ǫ) = u
(
f(k0)− x˜ǫ
)
.
4.3 Optimal solution for the α−maximin problem
With Lemma 4.1, Propositions 4.1 and 4.2, we can solve the α−maximin problem. For low
value of k0, there exists an infinite number of solutions and every optimal path fluctuates
between two different level. For high value of k0, there exists unique solution, and this
solution is constant from the date t = 1.
Proposition 4.3. For any k0 ≥ 0, there exists ǫ
∗ ≥ 0 such that
V(k0) = αW (ǫ
∗) + (1− α) (νˆ(k0)− ǫ
∗) .
Moreover, there exists k0 ≤ k0 such that
i) For 0 ≤ k0 ≤ k0, every optimal path {kt}
∞
t=0 fluctuates between two different values
and never converges:
lim inf
t→∞
kt < lim sup
t→∞
kt.
ii) For k0 ≥ k0, there exists unique solution and this solution is constant from the date
t = 1.
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5. Constant productivity and logarithmic utility
function
In this section, we provide some computations for the case the productivity is constant
(f(k) = Ak) and the utility function is logarithmic u(c) = ln c. The optimal policy
function is8
σ(k) = βAk.
Assume that A > 1. Hence k =∞.
By induction, one has
kˆt = (βA)
t k0,
cˆt = A(1− β) (βA)
t k0.
The value function is defined as
v(k0) =
∞∑
t=0
βt ln ct
=
lnA+ ln(1− β) + ln k0
1− β
+ (lnβ + lnA)
∞∑
t=0
tβt.
1. Consider the case A > 1
β
. For this case, ks = ∞. Hence for any k0 we have
0 < k0 < k
s. By Lemma 3.3, W ′(0) = ∞ and W ′(ǫ˜) = 0. For any a there is an
optimal sacrifice level ǫ∗ satisfying W ′(ǫ∗) = a. There is T such that for 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
u
(
f(k∗t )− k
∗
t+1
)
= u (f(k0)− k0)− ǫ,
which is equivalent to
ln
(
Ak∗t − k
∗
t+1
)
= ln(A− 1) + ln k0 − ǫ.
For 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
k∗t+1 = Ak
∗
t −
(A− 1)k0
eǫ
.
The value T is the smallest positive integer such that
u
(
f(k∗T+1)− σ(k
∗
T+1)
)
≥ u (f(k0)− k0)− ǫ,
which is equivalent to
ln
(
Ak∗T+1 − βAk
∗
T+1
)
≥ ln (Ak0 − k0)− ǫ.
This is equivalent to
lnA+ ln(1− β) + ln k∗T+1 ≥ ln(A− 1) + ln k0 − ǫ.
8See Stokey & Lucas, with Prescott [23].
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The value T is the first integer number satisfying
k∗T+1 ≥
A− 1
A(1− β)
×
k0
eǫ
.
The sequence {k∗T+t}
∞
t=0 is the solution of Ramsey problem with initial state k
∗
T+1.
2. Consider the case A < 1
β
. In this case, ks = 0 and every solution of Ramsey problem
converges to zero. The critical value ǫ˜ is then
ǫ˜ = u (f(k0)− k0)− u(0)
=∞.
We will then determine W ′(0). For ǫ close to zero, the critical time T from which
u(cǫt) = u (f(k0)− k0)− ǫ is T = 1.
The capital level kǫ1 is solution to
u (f(k1)− k1) = u (f(k0)− k0)− ǫ.
This implies
ln (Akǫ1 − k
ǫ
1) = ln(A− 1) + ln k0 − ǫ.
Hence
kǫ1 =
k0
eǫ
.
We have
W (ǫ) = u (f(k0)− k
ǫ
1) +
β
1− β
(u (f(k0)− k0)− ǫ)
= ln
(
Ak0 −
k0
eǫ
)
+
β
1− β
(ln (Ak0 − k0)− ǫ)
= ln
(
A−
1
eǫ
)
+
β
1− β
(ln(A− 1) + ln k0 − ǫ) .
Hence for ǫ close to zero,
W ′(ǫ) =
e−ǫ
A− e−ǫ
−
β
1− β
.
Let ǫ converges to zero, we get
W ′(0) =
1− βA
(A− 1)(1− β)
.
We then have Proposition 5.1. The equality parameter has strong effect if it is
sufficiently high. Otherwise, there is no difference between the behaviour following
Ramsey-Rawls criterion and the one following Rawls criterion.
Proposition 5.1. i) For a ≤ 1−βA(A−1)(1−β) , we have ǫ
∗ ≥ 0, and there exists T such
that:
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a) For 0 ≤ t ≤ T , u(c∗t ) > ln(A− 1) + ln k0 − ǫ
∗.
b) For t ≥ T + 1, u(c∗t ) = ln(A− 1) + ln k0 − ǫ
∗.
ii) For a ≥ 1−βA(A−1)(1−β) , ǫ
∗ = 0. The optimal path is constant: k∗t = k0 for any
t ≥ 0.
6. Conclusion
In this article we establish the solution of saving problems under Ramsey-Rawls and
maximin criteria. The optimisation of the inf part leads to a status-quo situation. In order
to circumvent the difficulties created by the inf part, we study the modified problems, by
considering what is the best choice to do if we accept to lower the value of the inf part
to some ǫ. Lowering this part gives us rooms to improve the value of the Ramsey part or
the sup part.
We must do attention that though the modified problems have time-consistant solutions
(for each given ǫ), it is not the same for the original problems. The reason is that the
optimal value of ǫ depends on the initial state k0. Moreover, the Ramsey-Rawls and
maximin criteria are not consistent in time. Without no commitment between dates, or
generations, it is possible that the in the future the economic agent desires to revise the
past decision.
As a response to this time-inconsistency challenge, in our opinion, an approach by con-
sidering the markovian rules, as presented in the seminar work of Phelps & Pollack [21]
may be a good idea. Phelps & Pollack [21] consider the existence and properties of linear
stationary markov equilibria in the context of quasi-hyperbolic discounting. For general
equilibria, this question becomes difficult and complicated, even in the case of constant
productivity, as pointed out in the work of Krusell & Smith [20]. For a review of this
literature, and an excellent analysis about saving and dissaving under quasi-hyperbolic
discounting criterion, see Cao & Werming [8].
In our intuition, the Ramsey-Rawls criterion challenges us with the similar difficulties. We
can at least follow the ideas of Phelps & Pollack [21] and Cao & Werming [8] to study
the linear markovian rules and saving behaviour9. But this should be subject to another
study.
A. Proof of Lemma 2.1
(i) Consider the sequence of feasible paths kn which converges to k in the the product
topology.
Fix any ǫ > 0. By the definition of ν(k), there exists T such that u(cT ) < inft≥0 u(ct) + ǫ.
By the convergence of the sequence {kn}∞n=0 in product topology, we get limn→∞ c
n
T = cT .
Hence for n sufficient large, it is true that u(cnT ) < u(cT ) + ǫ. This implies
inf
t≥0
u(cnt ) ≤ u(c
n
T )
< u(cT ) + ǫ
9In the same spirit, Asheim & Ekeland [5] study the markovian equilibira under the Chichilnisky
criterion, and prove that the weight of the infinite future plays no role in the determination of the equilibria.
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< inf
t≥0
u(ct) + 2ǫ.
Thus
lim sup
n→∞
ν(kn) < ν(k) + 2ǫ.
Let ǫ converges to zero, we get the upper semi-continuity of ν.
(ii) The part (i) is a consequence of the upper semi-continuity of ν and the compactness
of Π(k0) in respect to product topology.
B. Proof of Proposition 2.1
(i) Denote k∗ as a solution to the problem. For any t ≥ 0,
u
(
f(k∗t )− f(k
∗
t+1)
)
≥ ν(k∗)
≥ ν(k0, k0, . . . )
= u (f(k0)− k0) .
We then have f(k0)− k
∗
1 ≥ f(k0)− k0, which is equivalent to k
∗
1 ≤ k0.
Suppose that k∗t ≤ k0 for some t. Then
k0 − k
∗
t+1 ≥ f(k0)− f(k
∗
t )
≥ f ′(k0)(k0 − k
∗
t )
≥ k0 − k
∗
t ,
which implies k∗t+ ≤ k
∗
t . By induction, k0 ≥ k
∗
t for all t. Furthermore, the sequence (k
∗
t )
is decreasing and then converges to kˆ ≤ k0.
From the continuity of f , we have that f(kˆ)− kˆ ≥ f(k0)−k0. But the function f(x)−x is
increasing in [0, k], thus, f(kˆ)− kˆ ≤ f(k0)−k0, then kˆ = k0, and k
∗
t = k0 for all t, because
k0 ≥ k
∗
t and the sequence {k
∗
t }
∞
t=0 is decreasing to k0.
(ii) First, consider the sequence k = (k0, x, x, . . .) which is feasible. We have
max
k∈Π(k0)
ν (k) ≥ f(k)− k.
Let ks be an optimal solution. Since for all t ≥ 0, f(k∗t )− k
∗
t+1 ≥ f(k)− k,
k − k∗t+1 ≥ f(k)− f(k
∗
t )
≥ f ′(k)(k − k∗t )
= k − k∗t .
This implies k∗t+1 ≤ k
∗
t for any t. The sequence k
s is decreasing and converges to some
kˆ. By the continuity of f , f(kˆ)− kˆ ≥ f(k)− k. Since k maximizes f(x)− x, this implies
kˆ = k. Hence
νˆ(k0) = f(k)− k.
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Since k0 > x, by induction, we can construct a sequence k which satisfies: for all t,
k < kt+1 < f(kt) − f(x) + k. With this sequence, we have f(kt) − kt+1 > f(k) − k,
and kt+1 < kt, since f(kt) − kt < f(k) − k. So the sequence {kt}
∞
t=0 converges to k and
νˆ(k0) = f(k)− k. We have an infinity number of sequences satisfying this property. The
problem has an infinite number of solutions.
C. Proof of Proposition 3.1
Recall that for 0 ≤ k0 ≤ k, for any feasible sequence {kt}
∞
t=0,
inf
t≥0
u
(
f(kt)− kt+1
)
≤ νˆ(k0).
Let {k∗t }
∞
t=0 be the optimal solution of problem (P ). Define
ǫ∗ = νˆ(k0)− inf
t≥0
u(c∗t ).
We have
V (k0) =
∞∑
t=0
βtu(c∗t ) + a inf
t≥0
u(c∗t )
=
∞∑
t=0
βtu(c∗t ) + a (νˆ(k0)− ǫ
∗)
≤W (ǫ∗) + a (νˆ(k0)− ǫ
∗) .
Conversely, for any ǫ ≥ 0,
W (ǫ) + a (νˆ(k0)− ǫ) =
∞∑
t=0
βtu (cǫt) + a (νˆ(k0)− ǫ)
≤
∞∑
t=0
βtu (cǫt) + a inf
t≥0
u (cǫt)
≤ V (k0).
The proof is completed.
D. Proof of Proposition 3.2
Obviously W is increasing. The concavity of W comes from the concavity of utility
function u and production function f .
We consider first the case 0 ≤ k0 ≤ k. For each ǫ > 0, let x
∗(ǫ) be the smallest x ≥ k0
such that
u
(
f(x)− x
)
≥ u
(
f(k0)− k0
)
− ǫ.
If the strict inequality is satisfied for any x ≥ k0, let x
∗(ǫ) =∞.
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(i) We consider the case
f ′(k0) >
1
β
.
First, observe that ks > 0 and k0 < k
s.
Since the function x − σ(x) is strictly increasing in (k0, k
s), either x∗(ǫ) = ∞, either x∗
is finite and 0 < x∗(ǫ) < ks. Indeed, it is obvious that ks = ∞ implies x∗ = ∞. Suppose
that ks is finite. Then ks = σ(ks) and hence u
(
f(ks)− σ(ks)
)
< u
(
f(k0)− k0
)
− ǫ. This
implies x∗ is finite and k0 < x
∗ < ks.
We will prove the following claim: for any t, kǫt < k
s. This is true if for any t, kǫt < x
∗(ǫ).
Consider the case there exists T satisfying: kǫt < x
∗(ǫ) ≤ kǫt+1.
We have
u
(
f(kǫt)− k
ǫ
t+1
)
≥ u
(
f(k0)− k0
)
− ǫ
> u
(
f(ks)− ks
)
.
Then kǫt+1 < k
s.
Let {kˇt}
∞
t=T+1 be the solution of Ramsey problem with initial state k
ǫ
t+1. Since k
ǫ
t+1 < k
s,
kˇt < k
s for any t ≥ T + 1 and
inf
t≥T+1
u(cˇt) = u
(
f(kǫt+1)− σ(k
ǫ
t+1)
)
≥ u
(
f(x∗(ǫ))− σ(x∗(ǫ))
)
= u
(
f(k0)− k0
)
− ǫ.
Hence the sequence {k0, k
ǫ
1, . . . , k
ǫ
t , k
ǫ
t+1, kˇT+2, kˇT+2, . . . } is the optimal solution for the
problem (P ǫ), or kˇt = k
ǫ
t for any t ≥ T +1. The prove that k
ǫ
t < k
s for any t is completed.
Consider the Lagrangian:
L =
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct)−
∞∑
t=0
βtλt
[
ct + kt+1 − f(kt)
]
−
∞∑
t=0
βtµt
[
u
(
f(k0)− k0
)
− ǫ− u(ct)
]
.
By the Inada condition of u, at optimal the consumption and capital level are strictly
positive. The Lagrangian parameters for these constraints are hence zero.
For any t:
(1 + µt)u
′(cǫt) = λt,
λt = βλt+1f
′(kǫt+1).
This implies for any t:
(1 + µt)u
′(cǫt) = β(1 + µt+1)u
′(cǫt+1)f
′(kǫt+1)
≥ βf ′(kǫt+1)u
′(cǫt+1).
Suppose that u (cǫT ) > u
(
f(k0)− k0
)
− ǫ. The constraint does not bind and hence µT = 0.
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Since f ′(kǫT+1) ≥
1
β
, then u′(cǫT ) ≥ u
′(cǫT+1), and hence c
ǫ
t+1 ≥ c
ǫ
T . The (T+1)
th constraint
also does not bind: u
(
cǫT+1
)
> u
(
f(k0)− k0
)
− ǫ.
By induction, for any t ≥ T + 1, u (cǫt) > u
(
f(k0) − k0
)
− ǫ and µt = 0. The sequence
{(cǫt, k
ǫ
t+1)}
∞
t=T is increasing and satisfies Euler equations. Hence {k
ǫ
t}
∞
t=T is the solution
for Ramsey problem with initial state kǫT . We also have limt→∞ k
ǫ
t = k
s.
(ii) Consider the case
1 < f ′(k0) <
1
β
.
Necessary condition for this is 0 ≤ ks <∞. Recall that we are working in the case k0 ≤ k.
We first prove that kǫt > k
s for any t ≥ 0. Assume that there exists T such that kǫT ≤ k
s.
We have
u
(
f(kǫT )− k
ǫ
T+1
)
≥ νˆ(k0)− ǫ
= u
(
f(k0)− k0
)
− ǫ
> u
(
f(k0)− k0
)
− ǫ˜
= u
(
f(ks)− ks
)
,
which implies kǫT+1 < k
ǫ
T < k
s, since f(x)−x is strictly increasing in (0, ks). By induction,
the sequence {kǫT+t}
∞
t=0 is decreasing and converges to k < k
s. Taking the limit, we get
u
(
f(ks)− ks
)
> u
(
f(k)− σ(k)
)
≥ νˆ(k0)− ǫ
≥ u
(
f(k0)− k0
)
− ǫ
> u
(
f(ks)− ks
)
,
a contradiction.
Once the property that kǫt > k
s for any t ≥ 0 established, we re-utilise the Lagrangian:
L =
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct)−
∞∑
t=0
βtλt
[
ct + kt+1 − f(kt)
]
−
∞∑
t=0
βtµt
[
u
(
f(k0)− k0
)
− ǫ− u(ct)
]
.
For any t:
(1 + µt)u
′(cǫt) = λt,
λt = βλt+1f
′(kǫt+1).
This implies for any t:
u′(cǫt) ≤ (1 + µt)u
′(cǫt)
= β(1 + µt+1)u
′(cǫt+1)f
′(kǫt+1).
If u (cǫT ) > u
(
f(k0) − k0
)
− ǫ, then the constraint does not bind, and µT = 0. Since
22
f(kǫT ) <
1
β
, we get u′(cǫT−1) < u
′(cǫT ), which implies c
ǫ
T−1 > c
ǫ
T , with the direct consequence
u
(
cǫT−1
)
> u
(
f(k0)− k0
)
− ǫ.
By induction, we get for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
u (cǫt) > u
(
f(k0)− k0
)
− ǫ.
If this property is ensured for any t ≥ 0, the the sequence {kǫt}
∞
t=0 satisfies Euler equations
and transversality condition, hence it is the optimal solution for Ramsey problem and
converges to ks: a contradiction, since
u
(
f(ks)− ks
)
< u
(
f(k0)− k0
)
− ǫ.
Hence there exists T such that for any t ≥ T ,
u (cǫT ) = u
(
f(k0)− k0
)
− ǫ.
Obviously, for any t ≥ 0, we have
u
(
cǫT+t
)
= u
(
f(k0)− k0
)
− ǫ,
otherwise using the same arguments in the induction, we get u (cǫT ) > u
(
f(k0) − k0
)
− ǫ,
a contradiction.
For the lase case f ′(k0) ≤ 1, or k0 ≥ k, we use the same arguments as for the case
1 ≤ f ′(k0) ≤
1
β
, with the observation that the value of νˆ(k0) is u
(
f(k)− k
)
and f(k)−k ≥
f(ks)− ks.
E. Proof of Lemma 3.3
From the concavity of the functions u and f , the feasible set Πǫ(k0) is convex. This implies
also that the function W (ǫ) is concave in respect to ǫ. The strict property comes frome
the strict concavity of the utility function u. For ǫ ≥ ǫ˜, the function W becomes constant.
Hence W is only strictly concave on [0, ǫ˜].
(i) We prove that W ′(0) = +∞. Consider T (ǫ) in the proof of Proposition 3.2.
For any 0 ≤ t ≤ T (ǫ):
ǫ = u
(
f(k0)− k0
)
− u
(
f(kǫt)− k
ǫ
t+1
)
≥ u′
(
f(k0)− k0
) (
f(k0)− k0 − f(k
ǫ
t) + k
ǫ
t+1
)
≥ u′
(
f(k0)− σ(k0)
) (
f ′(k0)(k0 − k
ǫ
t) + k
ǫ
t+1 − k0
)
.
This implies
kǫt+1 − k0 ≤
ǫ
u′
(
f(k0)− k0
) + f ′(k0)(kǫt − k0).
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By induction, we get for any t ≥ 0,
kǫt+1 − k0 ≤
[
f ′(k0)
]t+1
− 1
f ′(k0)− 1
×
ǫ
u′
(
f(x∗)− x∗
) .
Hence
x∗(ǫ)− k0 ≤ kT (ǫ)+1 − k0
≤
[
f ′(k0)
]T (ǫ)+1
− 1
f ′(k0)− 1
×
ǫ
u′
(
f(k0)− k0
) .
W (ǫ) =
T (ǫ)∑
t=0
βtu (cǫt) +
∞∑
t=T (ǫ)+1
βtu (cǫt)
=
(
u
(
f(k0 − k0
)
− ǫ
) T (ǫ)∑
t=0
βt + βT (ǫ)+1v(kǫT (ǫ)).
Hence
W (ǫ)−W (0) = −ǫ
T (ǫ)∑
t=0
βt + βT (ǫ)+1
(
v
(
kǫT (ǫ)
)
−
u
(
f(k0)− k0
)
1− β
)
= −ǫ
1− βT (ǫ)+1
1− β
+ βT (ǫ)+1
(
v
(
kǫT (ǫ)
)
−
u
(
f(k0)− k0
)
1− β
)
.
Now we prove that
lim
ǫ→0
βT (ǫ)
ǫ
= +∞.
Indeed, recall that[
f ′(k0)
]T (ǫ)+1
− 1
f ′(k0)− 1
×
ǫ
u′
(
f(k0)− k0
) ∼ x∗(ǫ)− k0.
This implies(
f ′(k0)
)T (ǫ)
ǫ ∼ O(1).
Hence
T (ǫ) ln
(
f ′(k0)
)
∼ − ln(ǫ),
which is equivalent to
T (ǫ) ∼ −
ln(ǫ)
ln
(
f ′(k0)
) .
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We have
βT (ǫ) ∼
(
elnβ
)− ln(ǫ)
ln
(
f ′(k0)
)
∼ ǫ
−
ln β
ln
(
f ′(k0)
)
∼ ǫ
ln( 1β )
ln
(
f ′(k0)
)
.
Since f ′(k0) >
1
β
, we have
lim
ǫ→0
βT (ǫ)
ǫ
= lim
ǫ→0
ǫ
ln( 1β )
ln
(
f ′(k0)
)−1
=∞,
which implies W ′(0) = +∞.
(ii) First assume that ks < k0 ≤ k. Now we prove that W
′(0) < +∞. For ǫ small:
W (ǫ)−W (0) =
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
u
(
f(kǫt)− k
ǫ
t+1
)
− u
(
f(k0)− k0
)]
≤ u′
(
f(k0)− k0
) ∞∑
t=0
βt
[
f(kǫt)− f(k0)− k
ǫ
t+1 + k0
]
≤ u′
(
f(k0)− k0
) ∞∑
t=0
βt
[
f ′(k0)(k
ǫ
t − k0)− k
ǫ
t+1 + k0
]
≤ u′
(
f(k0)− k0
) ∞∑
t=0
βt
[
f ′(k0)(k
ǫ
t − k0)
]
≤ u′
(
f(k0)− k0
)
f ′(k0)
∞∑
t=0
βt [kǫt − k0]
≤ u′
(
f(k0)− k0
)
f ′(k0)
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
f ′(k0)
]t+1
− 1
f ′(k0)− 1
×
ǫ
u′
(
f(k0)− k0
)
= f ′(k0)
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
f ′(k0)
]t+1
− 1
f ′(k0)− 1
× ǫ
= O(ǫ),
since βf ′(k0) < 1.
This implies W (ǫ)−W (0) = O(ǫ), or W ′(0) < +∞.
Now assume that k is finite and k0 ≥ k. We use exactly the same arguments in the proof
of part (ii), by changing the constrains u(ct) ≥ u (f(k0)− k0)− ǫ by u(ct) ≥ u
(
f(k)− k
)
.
Now we prove thatW ′(ǫ˜) = 0. For ǫ close enough to ǫ˜, the critical time T (ǫ) from which the
optimal path behaves as a solution of Ramsey problem with initial state kǫ
T (ǫ) is T (ǫ) = 1.
We then have
u (f(k0)− k
ǫ
1) = u (f(k0)− k0)− ǫ,
and the sequence {kǫ1+t}
∞
t=0 is the solution of Ramsey problem with initial state k
ǫ
1.
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This implies
W (ǫ) = u (f(k0)− k0)− ǫ+ βv(k
ǫ
1),
and
W ′(ǫ) = −1 + βv′(kǫ1)×
dk′1
dǫ
.
By the implicite function theorem, we have
dkǫ1
dǫ
=
1
u′ (f(k0)− kǫ1)
.
Observe that by letting ǫ converges to ǫ˜ we have
lim
ǫ→ǫ˜
kǫ1 = σ(k0).
This implies
W ′−(ǫ˜) = −1 + βv
′ (σ(k0))×
1
u′ (f(k0)− σ(k0))
.
Recall that it is well-known in dynamic programming literature that
v(k0) = max
0≤k1≤f(k0)
[u (f(k0)− k1) + βv(k1)]
= u (f(k0 − σ(k0)) + βv (σ(k0)) .
Combining with Inada condition, this implies
−u′ (f(k0)− σ(k0)) + βv
′ (σ(k0)) = 0,
which is equivalent to
W ′(ǫ˜) = 0.
(iii) Since for any 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ ǫ˜, there exists T such that the equality constraint correspond-
ing to T bind. Hence the solutions corresponding to difference values of ǫ are different.
Combining this with the strict concavity of u, we get W is strictly concave in [0, ǫ˜].
F. Proof of Proposition 3.3
For any 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ ǫ˜, the optimal solution satisfies the following property: there exists t such
that u (cǫt) = u
(
f(k0) − k0
)
. Hence the solutions corresponding to difference values of ǫ
are also different. Combining with the strictly concavity of u, the function W is strictly
concave in [0, ǫ˜]. This implies the existence of an unique left derivative of W .
Since for any a > 0, we have W ′−(ǫ˜) = 0 < a < W
′(0) =∞, there exists unique 0 < ǫ < ǫ˜
such that W ′(ǫ∗) = a. The statement of the Lemma is a consequence of Propositions 3.1
and 3.2.
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G. Proof of Lemma 4.1
Consider any feasible sequence {kt}
∞
0 ∈ Π(k0), with ct = f(kt)− kt+1, define
ǫˆ = νˆ(k0)− inf
t≥0
u (ct) .
Obviously,
(1− α) sup
t≥0
u(ct) + α inf
t≥0
u(ct) = α sup
t≥0
u(ct) + (1− α) (ν(k0)− ǫˆ)
≤ αW(ǫˆ) + (1− α) (ν(k0)− ǫˆ)
≤ sup
ǫ≥0
[(1− α)W(ǫ) + α (ν(k0)− ǫ)] .
Now consider any feasible sequence {kt}
∞
0 ∈ Π(k0) satisfying the constraints of the modi-
fied problem.
α sup
t≥0
u(ct) + (1− α) (ν(k0)− ǫ) ≤ α sup
t≥0
u(ct) + (1− α) inf
t≥0
u(ct)
≤ V(k0).
Taking the supremum in the left hand side, the proof of Lemma is completed.
H. Proof of Proposition 4.1
i) We prove that for any feasible sequence {kt}
∞
t=0 of the modified problem, we have for
any t ≥ 0,
xǫ ≤ kt < x
ǫ.
Assume the contrary of the first inequality, that for some T , kT < x
ǫ. Since the
function f(x)− x is strictly increasing in [0, k0], se have
u (f(kT )− kT ) < u (f(x
ǫ)− xǫ)
= u (f(k0)− k0)− ǫ
≤ u (f(kT )− kT+1) .
This implies that kT+1 ≤ kT < x
ǫ. By induction, the sequence {kT+t}
∞
t=0 is decreasing
and converge to some 0 ≤ k∗ < xǫ. Hence
u (f(k∗)− k∗)) < u (f(xǫ)− xǫ)
= u (f(k0)− k0)− ǫ,
a contradiction.
Consider the sequence {kt}
∞
t=0 determined as
k0 = k0,
u
(
f(kt)− kt+1
)
= u (f(k0)− k0)− ǫ.
It is easy to verify that the sequence {kt}
∞
t=0 is increasing and converges to x
ǫ, whether
this value is finite ou infinite.
Fix any feasible sequence {kt}
∞
t=0 of the modified problem. Assume that for some T ,
kT ≤ kT . As a consequence,
u
(
f(kt)− kt+1
)
= u (f(k0)− k0)− ǫ
≤ u (f(kT )− kT+1)
≤ u
(
f(kT )− kT+1
)
,
which implies kT+1 ≤ kT . By induction, for any t ≥ 0,
kT+t ≤ kT+t < x
ǫ.
For any t, xǫ ≤ kt < x
ǫ, hence for any feasible sequence:
sup
t≥0
u (f(kt)− kt+1) ≤ u (f(x
ǫ)− xǫ) .
Now we prove that there exists feasible path {kt}
∞
t=0 such that
supt≥0 u (f(kt)− kt+1) = u (f(x
ǫ)− xǫ). Fix any two sequences {xn}
∞
n=0 and
{xn}
∞
n=0 such that the former one is strictly decreasing and converges to x
ǫ and the
later one is strictly increasing and converges to xǫ.
x0 > x1 > · · · > xn > · · · → x
ǫ,
x0 < x1 < · · · < xn < · · · → x
ǫ.
We construct the sequence T0 < T1 < · · · < Tn and the sequence {kt}
∞
t=0 as follows.
For 0 ≤ t ≤ T0,
u (f(kt)− kt+1) = u (f(k0)− k0)− ǫ.
If we continue to use this equation to define kt+1 from kt to infinity, the sequence will
converges to xǫ. Hence the exists index T0 which is the smallest index t satisfying
kT0 > x0. Let kT0+1 = x0. We have
u (f(kT0)− kT0+1) = u (f(x0)− x0) .
For T0 + 1 ≤ T1, define the sequence as
u (f(kt)− kt+1) = u (f(k0)− k0)− ǫ.
Using the same argument for the definition of T0, there exists T1 the smallest index
satisfying kt > x1. Let kT1+1 = x1. We have
u (f(kT1)− kT1+1) = u (f(x1)− x1) .
And we define in the same way, by induction Tn+1 in function of Tn. For any n ≥ 0
we have
u (f(kTn)− kTn+1) = u (f(xn)− xn) .
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Let n converges to infinity,
lim
n→∞
u (f(kTn)− kTn+1) = u (f(x
ǫ)− xǫ) .
Hence
sup
t≥0
u (f(kt)− kt+1) = u (f(x
ǫ)− xǫ) .
Since the two sequence two sequences {xn}
∞
n=0 and {xn}
∞
n=0 can be defined arbitrarily,
there exist an infinite number of optimal solution.
Consider any optimal path {kt}
∞
t=0. It is easy to verify that if kT = x
ǫ, by
the constraint, kT+t = x
ǫ for any t ≥ 0, which implies supt≥0 u (f(kt)− kt+1) <
u (f(xǫ)− xǫ), a contradiction. Hence for any t, xǫ < kt < x
ǫ. Moreover, there exist
an infinite number T0 < T1 < · · · < Tn < . . . such that
lim
n→∞
u (f(kTnt)− kTn+1) = u (f(x
ǫ)− xǫ) .
Hence we have
lim
n→∞
kTn = x
ǫ,
lim
n→∞
kTn+1 = x
ǫ.
ii) This part is direct consequence of the proof of the first part.
iii) This is consequence of the first part and Lemma 4.1.
I. Proof of Proposition 4.2
i) First, we prove that for any k ≤ k0 ≤ x˜
ǫ, any feasible path {kt}
∞
t=0 ∈ Π
ǫ(k0), we have
x˜ǫ ≤ kt ≤ x˜ǫ.
Assume that there is some T such that kT < x˜ǫ. Then
u (f(kT )− kT ) < u
(
f(x˜)− x˜
)
= u
(
f(k)− k
)
− ǫ
≤ u (f(kT )− kT+1) ,
which implies kT+1 ≤ kT < x˜ǫ. By induction, the sequence {kT+t}∞t=0 is decreasingand converges to some k∗ < x˜ǫ, and
u (f(k∗)− k∗) < u
(
f(x˜)− x˜
)
= u
(
f(k)− k
)
− ǫ,
a contradiction.
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Assume that x˜ǫ ≤ kT ≤ x˜ǫ. Since
u (f(x˜ǫ)− x˜ǫ) ≤ u (f(kT )− kT+1)
≤ u (f(x˜ǫ)− kT+1) ,
we have kT+1 ≤ x˜
ǫ. This property is satisfied by k0, by induction, kt ≤ x˜
ǫ for all
t ≥ 0.
Since for any t, x˜ǫ ≤ kt ≤ x˜ǫ,
sup
t≥0
u (f(kt)− kt+1) ≤ u
(
f(x˜ǫ)− x˜ǫ) .
In order to prove that the left hand side is equal to the right hand side in the above
inequality, and there exists an infinite number of solution for the modified problem,
we prove that for any x˜ǫ ≤ k0 ≤ x˜ǫ, the sequence {k˜t}∞t=0 defined as below is increasingand converges to x˜ǫ:
k˜0 = k0,
u
(
f(k˜t)− k˜t+1
)
= u
(
f(k)− k
)
− ǫ, for all t ≥ 0.
Indeed, using the same arguments above, we have for any t, x˜ǫ ≤ k˜t ≤ x˜ǫ. Then
u
(
f(k˜t)− k˜t+1
)
= u (f(x˜ǫ)− x˜ǫ)
= u
(
f(k)− k
)
≤ u
(
f(k˜t)− k˜t
)
.
This implies k˜t ≤ k˜t+1 and the sequence {k˜t}
∞
t=0 is increasing and converges to the
solution of u (f(x)− x) = u
(
f(k)− k
)
, or
lim
t→∞
k˜t = x˜
ǫ.
Now fix two sequences {x˜n}∞n=0 which is strictly decreasing and converges to x˜ǫ, and{x˜n}∞n=0 which is strictly increasing and converges to x˜ǫ.
Using the same arguments as in the Proof of Proposition 4.1, we can construct a
feasible sequence {kt}
∞
t=0 ∈ Π
ǫ(k0) and a sequence of index T0 < T1 < · · · < Tn < . . .
such that for any n,
u (f(kTn)− kTn+1) = u
(
f(x˜n)− x˜n) .
And we have
sup
t≥0
u (f(kt)− kt+1) = lim
n→∞
u
(
f(x˜n)− x˜n
)
= u (f(x˜ǫ)− x˜ǫ) .
The two sequences {x˜n}∞n=0 and {x˜n}∞n=0 being chosen arbitrarily, there exists aninfinite number of optimal paths.
Consider any optimal path {kt}
∞
t=0. It is easy to verify that if kT = x˜ǫ, by
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the constraint, kT+t = x˜ǫ for any t ≥ 0, which implies supt≥0 u (f(kt)− kt+1) <
u
(
f(x˜ǫ)− x˜ǫ), a contradiction. Hence for any t, x˜ǫ < kt < x˜ǫ. Moreover, there existan infinite number T0 < T1 < · · · < Tn < . . . such that
lim
n→∞
u (f(kTnt)− kTn+1) = u
(
f(x˜ǫ)− x˜ǫ) .
Hence we have
lim
n→∞
kTn = x˜
ǫ,
lim
n→∞
kTn+1 = x˜ǫ.
ii) Consider now the case k0 ≥ x˜
ǫ. Take any feasible sequence {kt}
∞
t=0 ∈ Π
ǫ(k0). We
claim that for any t ≥ 0,
x˜ǫ ≤ kt ≤ k0.
Using the same arguments as in the proof of the part (i), we have kt ≥ x˜ǫ for any
t ≥ 0. Now we prove by induction that kt ≤ k0 for any t. Indeed, this is true for
t = 0. Assume that kt ≤ k0 for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T . If kT ≥ x˜
ǫ, then
u (f(kT )− kT ) ≤ u (f(x˜
ǫ)− x˜ǫ)
= u
(
f(k)− k
)
− ǫ
= u (f(kT )− kT+1) ,
which implies kT+1 ≤ kT ≤ k0. The claim is proved, hence for any t,
sup
t≥0
u (f(kt)− kt+1) ≤ u
(
f(k0)− x˜ǫ) .
It is easy to verify that the sequence {k∗t }
∞
t=0 = (k0, x˜ǫ, x˜ǫ, x˜ǫ, . . . ) is feasible and
sup
t≥0
u
(
f(k∗t )− k
∗
t+1
)
= u
(
f(k0)− x˜ǫ) .
To prove that this sequence is unique solution, take any feasible sequence {kt}
∞
t=0.
Assume that k1 > x˜ǫ. Hence
u (f(k0)− k1) < u
(
f(k0)− x˜ǫ) .
If k1 ≥ x˜
ǫ, then
sup
t≥1
u (f(kt)− kt+1) ≤ u
(
f(k1)− x˜ǫ
)
< u
(
f(k0)− x˜ǫ
)
.
If k1 ≤ x˜
ǫ, then
sup
t≥1
u (f(kt)− kt+1) ≤ u
(
f(x˜ǫ)− x˜ǫ
)
< u
(
f(k0)− x˜ǫ
)
.
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Combining these inequalities, we get
sup
t≥0
u (f(kt)− kt+1) = max
{
u (f(k0)− k1) , sup
t≥1
u (f(kt)− kt+1)
}
< u
(
f(k0)− x˜ǫ
)
.
For the case k1 = x˜ǫ, in order to keep the path being feasible, we must have kt = x˜ǫfor any t ≥ 1. The uniqueness of the optimal solution is proved.
J. Proof of Proposition 4.1
The first statement of the proposition is obvious, by Lemma 4.1. It is the same for the
statement (i), by Proposition 4.1.
For the part (i), observe that the optimal value ǫ∗ must satisfy
ǫ∗ ≤ νˆ(k0)
≤ u
(
f(k)− k
)
.
Hence there exists an upper bounde for x˜ǫ. Let k0 be this upper bound. For any k0 ≥ k0,
we have k0 ≥ x˜
ǫ∗ , and applying Proposition 4.2, the proof is completed.
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